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AFCA: THE FIRST FOOTHILL BETWEEN
AUSTRALIA’S TWIN PEAKS
Andrew Schmulow,☨ Virginia Dore,❋ Jacob Reardon☥ & William Hanna§

ABSTRACT
This paper traces the establishment of the new Australian Financial
Complaints Authority (AFCA). First it places this development within the
wider context of what we argue is an important new adjunct to the Australian
financial regulatory architecture, and by implication therefore, the
international significance of these reforms to countries that have adopted the
Australian ‘Twin Peaks’ model. By reference to the Ramsay Review and other
sources, we include analysis of AFCA’s forerunners, and their failures; and we
include comparative analysis from other jurisdictions. We provide analysis of
AFCA’s strengths and potential weaknesses, and some initial data on AFCA
outcomes. Finally, we provide concluding remarks on these reforms.

INTRODUCTION
i.

Locating the relevance of this study

In April 2017 Australia’s Review of the Financial System External Dispute Resolution and
Complaints Framework handed down its final report (the Review).1 Chief among its
recommendations was the establishment of a single External Dispute Resolution (EDR) body
(Ombud) for all financial disputes. First, by way of introduction, we analyse this development
within the context of its significance to Australia’s financial system regulatory model and, due to
the deployment of the Australian regulatory model elsewhere, by implication also the
international significance of this development. Thereafter we provide a detailed analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of these reforms from the perspective of consumer protection, and in
light of past failures. In particular we provide an analysis of how the reforms to the financial
☨ BA Honours LLB (Witwatersrand) GDLP (cum laude) (ANU) PhD (Melbourne). Admitted by the Supreme
Court of Victoria as an Australian Legal Practitioner. Advocate of the High Court of South Africa. Visiting Senior
Researcher, Oliver Schreiner School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Visiting Researcher,
Centre for International Trade, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul. Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Faculty of
Business & Law, University of Wollongong. Email for correspondence andys@uow.edu.au.
❋ LLB Honours (University of Wollongong). This research was undertaken while the author was in her final year,
LLB.
☥ BEcon&Fin (Economics) LLB (University of Wollongong). This research was undertaken while the author was
in his final year, LLB.
§ BComm (Finance) LLB (University of Wollongong). This research was undertaken while the author was in his
final year, LLB.
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Commonwealth Treasury, Parliament of Australia, Final Report: Review of the financial system external dispute
resolution and complaints framework (2017).
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ombud schemes in Australia may be expected to function, including an international comparative
analysis of ombud schemes in operation elsewhere.

International significance of Australian enhancements to the Twin Peaks model
2

The Australian financial system regulatory model – known as ‘Twin Peaks’ – consists of a peak
agency charged with compelling good market conduct and consumer protection (the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)), and a second peak agency, responsible for
prudential regulation (the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA)). The Australian
Twin Peaks model is regarded as an exemplar internationally, and has been copied in five other
3
4
5
6
countries to date: New Zealand, Belgium, The Netherlands, the UK, and most recently, South
7

8

Africa. Two countries have adopted hybrid/incomplete Twin Peaks regimes: Canada and
9

France. A further dozen or so countries have signalled an intention or interest to do likewise.

10

2

The term is a misnomer. It is based broadly upon Michael Taylor’s original proposal called ‘Twin Peaks’ (Taylor,
Michael W., ““Twin Peaks”: A regulatory structure for the new century”, Centre for the Study of Financial
Innovation, no. 20, London, UK, December 1995, pp 1-18.), which in turn was a riff off the eponymously titled
television series, popular at the time. (Conversation between the first author and Michael Taylor, August 2014). In
contradistinction, the original proposal put forth in Australia’s 1998 Financial System Inquiry (Wallis, Stan, Bill
Beerworth, Professor Jeffrey Carmichael, Professor Ian Harper & Linda Nicholls, “Financial System Inquiry”, 31
March 1997, pp 1-771, 26) clearly articulates Australia as a three-peak system (‘three agencies’ as described in the
report), in which the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) would assume a macro-prudential role. Nonetheless, the
most salient feature of the model adopted in Australia was not the role of the central bank – a role played by most
if not all central banks. Rather its most salient feature was the creation of two additional peaks, one for prudential
oversight, the other for conduct oversight. As a result, the term Twin Peaks is used to describe the prudential and
conduct structures in countries like Australia, and elsewhere, irrespective of the activities of the central bank.
3

Financial Markets Authority Act, No. 5 of 2011, (enacted: 18 April 2011), s 6. New Zealand Council of Financial
Regulators, “Regulatory Charter: Financial markets regulatory system”, in Financial Markets Conduct Regulatory
System, Financial Markets Authority, 28 July, 2016, p 7 ff.
4

Act amending the Act of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and financial services and the
Act of 22 February 1998 establishing the organic status of the National Bank of Belgium, and containing various
provisions, Belgian State Gazette N. 289, page 59135, 2010, (enacted: 2 July) Chapter III, s 2.
5
6

Financial Supervision Act, 2007, (enacted: 28 September 2006).
Financial Services Act, No. 21 of 2012.

7

Financial Sector Regulation Act, No. 9 of 2017, (enacted: Published in GG 41060 of 22 August 2017). A. D.
Schmulow, “Financial Regulatory Reform In South Africa: The Move Towards Twin Peaks”, African Journal of
International and Comparative Law: Revue Africaine de Droit International et Comparé, Vol. 25, no. 3 (May, 2017);
A. J. Godwin & A. D. Schmulow, “The Financial Sector Regulation Bill In South Africa: Lessons From Australia”,
South African Law Journal, Vol. 132, no. 4 (2015).
8

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act, 1985, (enacted: 2 July1987), s 4(1) and Financial
Consumer Agency of Canada Act, 2001, s 3.
9

Law No. 2010-1249 of 22 October 2010 on Banking and Financial Regulation (1), JORF n ° 0247 of October 23,
2010 page 18984, 2010, (enacted: 23 October 2010); Ordinance No. 2010-76 of 21 January 2010 amalgamating the
licensing and supervisory authorities of the bank and insurance, JORF n ° 0018 of 22 January 2010 page 1392, 2010,
(enacted: 21 January 2010). Cf Daniel Calvo, Juan Carlos Crisanto, Stefan Hohl & Oscar Pascual Gutiérrez,
“Financial supervisory architecture: what has changed after the crisis?”, series edited by Financial Stability Institute,
in FSI Insights on policy implementation, no. 8, Financial Stability Institute, Bank for International Settlements,
April, 2018, p 36, where the authors argue that Guatemala and El Salvador are also Twin Peaks jurisdictions. This
is, however, incorrect.
10

These include China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Kenya, Nigeria, the Federal level of the EU, and others.
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11

Twin Peaks is widely regarded as the optimal model for the regulation of the financial system;
it is the only model which places compelling good market conduct and consumer protection on
12
an equal footing with prudential regulation.
It is the separation of these functions – conduct and prudential – that defines Twin Peaks,
and is its greatest advantage over competing financial system regulatory models. This is based
upon two, important observations: in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC), and the
findings produced by the US Senate Inquiry, we have come to understand more fully that market
conduct and consumer abuse – as was evident in the US subprime industry – can, if left
13
unchecked, become a source of financial crisis. Second, in the aftermath of the Turner Review
in the UK, and the collapse of Halifax Bank of Scotland and Northern Rock, also during the
GFC, we have come to understand better than we had previously that conduct regulation and
14
prudential regulation cannot be enforced simultaneously; too often they are in direct conflict.

When prudential and consumer protection regulation are combined in a
15
single agency, at least one of them is likely to be done badly.
The only viable solution therefore is first to separate conduct and prudential regulation
and, second, create them as equals. Hence the acknowledgement of the optimality of the Twin
Peaks financial system regulatory architecture, and its increasing adoption world-wide. Because
16
it was adopted first in Australia, Australia’s experience of Twin Peaks is the longest and most
comprehensive, and so Australia has served as the touchstone for other adopters in the past, and
for those countries contemplating Twin Peaks adoption in the future.

11

Financial Markets Authority (FMA), “Presentation by Sean Hughes to the New Zealand Capital Markets Forum”,
‘News, Speeches’, 2011; John Manley, “Dutch regulator says “Twin Peaks” supervision best”, ‘Financial Regulatory
Forum’, Reuters, United States ed., 2009; Erika Botha & Daniel Makina, “Financial Regulation And Supervision:
Theory And Practice In South Africa”, International Business & Economics Research Journal Vol. 10, no. 11
(November, 2011), p 35.
12

Joseph J. Norton, “Global Financial Sector Reform: The Single Financial Regulator Model Based on the United
Kingdom FSA Experience - A Critical Reevaluation”, International Lawyer, Vol. 39, no. 1 (Spring, 2005), p 45;
Treasury Committee House of Commons, “Financial Regulation: a preliminary consideration of the Government’s
proposals”, series edited by Commons Select Committees, in Seventh Report of Session 2010–11, in Volume I:
Report, together with formal minutes, no. HC 430–I, Vol. 1, House of Commons, Parliament of the United
Kingdom, 27 January, 2011, p 32 § 83.
13

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, (January 2011). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Final Report of
the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, xviii; 113; 1256; 160; 227-30, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
14

Ibid., 159; 171; 307-8. Adair Turner, (March 2009). The Turner Review. A regulatory response to the global
banking crisis, 92, http://www.actuaries.org/CTTEES_TFRISKCRISIS/Documents/turner_review.pdf. FSA,
(December 2011). The failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland. Financial Services Authority Board Report, § 28 at
27, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/fsa-rbs.pdf.
15

Michael Taylor (September 2009). “'Twin Peaks' Revisited... a second chance for regulatory reform,” The Centre
for
the
Study
of
Financial
Innovation
(CSFI),
No.
89,
5,
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d620fce4b049bf4cd5be9b/t/55241044e4b03769e017208a/1428426820095
/Twin+Peaks+Revisited.pdf.
16

Recommendation 1: “Financial System Inquiry”, 31 March 1997, 31, and Recommendation 31, at 42.
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However, one half of the Twin Peaks model – that of compelling good market conduct
and protecting consumers (hereinafter referred to simply as ‘good conduct’) – has been so
inevident in Australia over the past decade that a Royal Commission of Inquiry (the Commission)
was constituted in late 2017 to inquire into misconduct in the banking, superannuation and
17
financial services industry. The evidence presented to, and the findings from that Inquiry, have
been difficult to comprehend, so widespread, long-standing, and egregious has been misconduct
in the Australian financial system. Current estimates put the number of victims at in excess of 2
18
million people – almost ten per cent of Australia’s total population. Similarly, current estimates
19

put the costs of remediation at in excess of AUD 10 billion. Some estimates put the damage
done at far higher levels. One study estimates more than 54 per cent of Australians have suffered
20
damage through misconduct, and suffered detriment worth approximately AUD 201 billion.
One of the most consistent themes that emerged from the Commission was the failure
of Australia’s market conduct and consumer protection peak, ASIC, to enforce the law, or
21
provide adequate consumer protection. This is the first salutary lesson for those jurisdictions
that have or intend to copy the Australian model: superior architecture is one thing, good
plumbing is quite another. The Australian model is architecturally optimal, but does not
guarantee effective enforcement – good plumbing. However, we argue in light of the findings
from this research, that an effective ombud can contribute to supporting good conduct – good
plumbing – within a Twin Peaks model in two important ways. First, an effective ombud will step
into the breach left by a conduct regulator’s failure to act. It will do so when a failure to act is due
to inefficacy. But it will also step into the breach where even a highly effective regulator fails to
act on a particular instance of misconduct. Such predicaments are unavoidable where regulators
have to direct their finite resources towards whatever they deem the greatest threat, and away
from threats they deem less severe. Consequently, there will be times, possibly even frequently,
when certain breaches attract little or no consequences. Second, where the ombud tackles
consumer abuse practices deemed to be ‘systemic’, it can also fill a gap left by a conduct regulator,
ineffective in discharging its responsibility to compel good market conduct. As such this study
presents important findings wherever Australia’s Twin Peaks model has, or will in the future, be
emulated.
Moreover, from an architectural perspective, there are deeper regulatory synergies that
exist between these reforms and the Twin Peaks architecture, as compared to the position in
Australia ex ante. Previously Australia had multiple, sectoral ombuds. This created confusion in
the minds of consumers, due in part to issues of jurisdictional overlap and underlap (as described
below). Multiple ombuds also created confusion for regulatees: on the one hand providers of
products and services were subject to the decisions of the single conduct regulator (ASIC). On
17

Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, “Home”,
2018, accessed: 11 January 2018, https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx.
18

Daniel Ziffer (2 December 2019). “Millions of bank customers have got money back but for others, the wait
continues,” ABC News, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-12-02/millions-remediated-by-banks-but-for-others-waitcontinues/11756426.
19

James Eyers, “Bank compensation costs could hit $10b”, Australian Financial Review, March 14, 2019. Available
at https://www.afr.com/companies/financial-services/bank-compensation-costs-could-hit-10b-20190513-p51mt6
20

Breidbach, C, Culnane, C, Godwin, A, Murawski, C & Sear, C, FinFuture: The Future of Personal Finance in
Australia,
The
University
of
Melbourne,
Melbourne,
2019,
https://www.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/3145612/FinFuture_White_Paper.pdf, 18.
21

Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, Final
Report, Vol 1, 1 February 2019, 3-5; 424.
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the other hand, providers were subject to the different and potentially conflicting interpretations
of the legislation and of ASIC’s guidelines, as a result of multiple EDR schemes.
A consolidated financial services ombud for Australia, by distinction, better reflects the
form of Australia’s conduct regulator: consolidated. Finally, a single ombud represents a more
streamlined and consolidated feedback-loop to a single conduct regulator: issues identified by
the ombud, especially those of a systemic nature, will be consolidated across the entire financial
industry, and adjudicated upon in a more harmonised and consistent manner, than would be the
case with multiple ombuds. That in turn allows the conduct regulator both a more
comprehensive view of trends in the financial industry, and facilitates a more harmonised
approach by the regulator to redressing those issues. By comparison, in a sectorally-based
regulatory model, for example, the gains that flow from creating a consolidated ombud will be of
little value in a regime where the underlying architecture does not support a consolidated
response in terms of financial consumer dispute resolution.
Countries that have, or intend, to adopt the Australian model focus much of their
attention on the strengths Twin Peaks brings to combatting financial crises through, for example,
its single-minded attention to prudential issues. But if financial crises can also emanate from
consumer abuse, then the extent to which the Australian EDR reforms act as a form of ‘doubleredundancy’ in combatting bad conduct – especially systemically bad conduct – they serve as a
potential important adjunct to the Twin Peaks architecture. An effective EDR scheme may,
therefore, be described as the first foothill between the twin peaks.

Significance for Australia of these reforms
The study is relevant to Australia for many of the same reasons: consumers were badly served
by ASIC in the decade preceding the Commission and, as the Ramsay Review demonstrated,
the previous ombud schemes were deeply flawed (see infra). So, as Australia grapples to
overcome what may be described as its great financial regulatory crisis (GF(r)C), a wellfunctioning ombud may be expected to alleviate the worst excesses which consumers of financial
products and services have faced. Moreover, a well-functioning ombud will ensure that ASIC is
made aware of systemic issues that the ombud observes. This will, at the very least, provide ASIC
with additional information necessary to fulfil its role in the overall Twin Peaks architecture,
which includes supporting APRA and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to prevent financial
22
crises. In that way an ombud can act as a canary in the coalmine.
In the event that ASIC is revitalised, in combination with an effective ombud, there will
be realistic prospects of combatting bad conduct and improving consumer outcomes in the
Australian economy. As such these reforms are significant in and of themselves, but also as part
of a broader effort to improve high-level regulatory goals: a financial system that is fair, efficient,
23
transparent and stable.

22 Tony D’Aloisio. “Responding to the global financial crisis: the ASIC story,” A speech by Tony D’Aloisio,
Chairman, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, to the Trans-Tasman Business Circle, 30 November
2010, https://download.asic.gov.au/media/1347350/speech-responding-global-crisis-nov-2011.pdf, 6; Tony
D’Aloisio. “Regulatory issues arising from the financial crisis for ASIC and for investors and financial consumers,”
A speech by ASIC Chairman Tony D’Aloisio to the Australian Financial Counselling & Credit Reform Association,
28 July 2009, https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/regulatory-issues-arising-from-the-financial-crisisfor-asic-and-for-investors-and-financial-consumers/, 6. Australian Securities and Investments Commission, to the
Trans-Tasman Business Circle, 30 November 2010,
23

ASIC, (25 February, 2020). “The ASIC – APRA relationship. The role of ASIC,” About ASIC, (accessed
electronically
3
March,
2020),
https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-role/other-regulators-andorganisations/the-asic-apra-relationship/.
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An overview of the reforms
24

The Review recommended the establishment of a single EDR body for all financial disputes,
because such a model, it was asserted, would facilitate better access to EDR, as well as deliver
higher levels of compensation.25 In addition, the Review stated that a single body would streamline
a system that was characterized by multiple bodies, operating in different jurisdictions. As such
it was envisaged that the lodgement of disputes and access to redress would be provided in a
seamless and timely manner.26
As of November 2018 the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA) assumed
the jurisdiction of all existing EDR bodies.27 This new EDR czar has a wide remit, and is able to
facilitate EDR across the entirety of financial service providers (FSPs). In doing so, AFCA will
retain the Financial Ombudsman Service’s (FOS) mandate of achieving fairness in all
circumstances.28 However, the new scheme will implement enhanced monetary limits, and more
robust decision-making criteria.29 It is also hoped that AFCA will mark a departure from an ad
hoc approach to the decision-making process, which was a constant source of criticism of the
previous regime.30
The centralisation of the EDR framework is not unique to Australia, and appears to be
part of a greater international trend, as will be discussed in Part IV. Though the advantages
identified internationally for single EDR schemes are manifold, ultimately the efficacy and
enforceability of AFCA determinations will be the lynchpins upon which its success will turn. As
highlighted by the Commission, there were concerns regarding the ability of favourable FOS
determinations to translate into favourable outcomes.31 Similarly, the difficulty in counteracting
non-compliance by FSPs in Australia, through non-litigious means, has proven to be a broad,
systemic challenge. Given that AFCA adjudicates disputes ex contractu as opposed to ex lege,32
it is questionable whether the new regime will be any more empowered to enforce its
determinations. This is a considerable source of concern for the scheme moving forward.

24
25
26

See n 1 above.
Ibid 9.
Ibid.

27

AFCA will amalgamate the Financial Ombudsman Service, the Credit and Investments Ombudsman and the
Superannuation Complaints Tribunal.
28

Financial Ombudsman Service, FOS Terms of Reference, Victoria, 2015, cl 8.2; Australian Financial Complaints
Authority, Australian Financial Complaints Authority Complaint Resolution Scheme Rules, Victoria, 2018, s
A.2.1(d).
29

Australian Financial Complaints Authority, Australian Financial Complaints Authority Complaint Resolution
Scheme Rules, Victoria, 2018, ss C.1.2, A.7.2, A.2.1.
30

This is particularly so in relation to FOS.

31

See generally, Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and
Financial Services Industry, Interim Report (2018) vol 1, 302-304.
32

Namely, on a contractual basis instead of legislative or statutory basis. See eg, Mickovski v Financial Ombudsman
Service Ltd (2012) 36 VR 456 and the text accompanying footnote 160, below.
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SOME PRELIMINARY ISSUES
i.

Royal Commissions and the Review

In 2014 the findings of an Australian Federal Senate Inquiry into the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC) recommended a Royal Commission to investigate the
widespread fraudulent activity and unethical behaviour of Australia’s banks, and the poor
performance of the regulators of the financial sector.33 By 2017, and after a decade of mounting
scandals,34 anti-bank sentiment had reached a breaking-point, in which the Australian Federal
Government finally succumbed to public and political pressure, and established a Royal
Commission.35 A Royal Commission being the ‘highest form of inquiry on matters of public
importance,’ former High Court Judge, the Honourable Kenneth Madison Hayne AC QC
(Hayne) was appointed Commissioner of the investigation.36 In accordance with the Terms of
Reference (TOR), Hayne’s interim Report was handed down in September 2018, with the Final
Report issued in February 2019. In its Final Report, the Commission recommended criminal
prosecution in some 14 cases.37
Hayne’s interim report identified extensive instances of misconduct, ranging from
unethical conduct and breaches of the Code of Banking Practice, to fraud and breaches of law.38
The Commission identified systemic failures of FOS,39 illustrating a history of reticence to exact
discipline or impose appropriate penalties on contravening institutions.40 In light of the
Commission’s findings outlined in its interim report, the Coalition Government undertook to
take action in the banking and financial services industry. As part of that action the Federal
Government adopted the recommendations of the Review as ‘one of a number of initiatives from
the Coalition in an attempt to rebuild trust’ in the financial sector.41

33

The Senate, Economics References Committee, Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (June 2014) xxiv, 12.28.
34

For a succinct overview of the controversies that have arisen, and the build-up to the Banking Royal Commission,
see David Chau and Emily Clark, ‘Banking royal commission: How did we get here?’ ABC News (online), 12
February 2018, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-30/banking-royal-commission-how-did-we-get-here/9210248
>.
35

David Crow, ‘Malcolm Turnbull Admits ‘Political Mistake’ on Bank Royal Commission’, Sydney Morning Herald
(online), 23 April 2018 <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/malcolm-turnbull-admits-political-mistake-onbank-royal-commission-20180423-p4zb2x.html>.
36

See Australian Government (online) <https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx>.

37

See for example: Sarah Danckert, Clancy Yeates & John Collett, “Revealed: bank royal commission rap sheets
made public”, ‘Business/Banking and Finance/Banking Royal Commission’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Business
Day ed., 2018 Sarah Danckert, Clancy Yeates & Ruth Williams, “CommInsure, AMP could face criminal charges”,
‘Business/Banking and Finance/Banking Royal Commission’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Business Day ed.,
2018; Sarah Danckert, Clancy Yeates & John Collett, op cit
38

The Commission, Interim Report, above n 31, vol 1, 267.

39

Stephanie Chalmers, ‘There’s a New Place to Lodge Complaints About the Banks – and it’s Already Been
Flooded’, ABC News (online), 5 December 2018 <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-05/new-financialcomplaints-authority-more-than-6500-complaints/10585690>.
40
41

The Commission, Interim Report, above n 31, vol 1, 267-300.

Adele Ferguson, ‘Bank compensation schemes need scrutiny too’, The Australian Financial Review (online), 7
October
2018
<https://www.afr.com/business/banking-and-finance/bank-compo-schemes-need-scrutiny-too20181006-h16ba3>.

8

AFCA: Enhancing Australia’s Twin Peaks
ii.

Ramsay review

Prior to the Royal Commission, and commencing in mid-2016, in response to unpaid
compensation owed to victims of financial misconduct, 42 a review was undertaken by an expert
panel (‘the Panel’). The Panel comprised Professor Ian Ramsay as Chair, Julie Abramson and
Alan Kirkland.43 The Panel was tasked with carrying out the ‘first comprehensive review of the
financial system’s EDR framework’.44 At the time of the review, Australia’s EDR framework
comprised FOS, the Credit and Investments Ombudsman (CIO), and the Superannuation
Complains Tribunal (SCT).
The mandate of the Panel was to assess the EDR framework against the Review’s core
principles of efficiency, equity, complexity, transparency, accountability, comparability of
outcomes and regulatory costs.45 The Panel was also required to make recommendations for the
implementation of ‘best practice developments from other sectors in Australia, and from
overseas jurisdictions’.46 The original TOR required that, as part of its assessment, the Review
was to consider whether changes to the then current financial sector dispute resolution and
complaints scheme were necessary, in order to deliver effective outcomes for users.47 In
conducting the Review, the Panel took submissions from parties ‘representing a wide range of
interests’ including both organisations and individual consumers.48
The Final Report of the Review was handed down in April 2017. Many of the issues
associated with the old regime identified by the Panel are discussed in the following part of this
paper. In seeking to rectify those issues and to ensure the efficient and effective functioning of
the Australian EDR system, the Review made 11 recommendations. The central
recommendation was the establishment of a single EDR body for all financial disputes to replace
FOS, CIO and SCT. Other recommendations addressed the features and powers of the single
EDR body, enhancing access to redress for consumers (including raising monetary limits and
compensations caps), ensuring that the single EDR body is accountable to users, increasing the
transparency of internal dispute resolution (IDR), and increasing ASIC oversight of the single
EDR body. Those recommendations resulted in the establishment of the Australian Financial
Complaints Authority (AFCA), which commenced receiving complaints in November 2018. The
issues giving rise to the recommendations in the Review, and the results of those
recommendations now implemented, comprise the focal point of this paper.49

42

Georgia Wilkins, ‘Compensation scheme for financial victims will restore trust: Ian Ramsay’, Sydney Morning
Herald (online), 8 June 2017 <https://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/compensation-scheme-forfinancial-victims-will-restore-trust-ian-ramsay-20170608-gwn04p.html>.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Commonwealth Treasury, the Review, Final Report, above n 1, 3-4.
Ibid 1.
Ibid 3.
Ibid.
Ibid 5.
Ibid 1.

On 2 February 2017 the Terms of Reference were amended to allow for the preparation of a Supplementary
Final Report of the Review of external dispute resolution and complaints arrangements in the financial system;
Commonwealth Treasury, Parliament of Australia, Supplementary Final Report: Review of the Financial System
External Dispute Resolution and Complaints Framework, (2017) v.
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THE OLD REGIME
i.

Efficacy

Multiple bodies with overlapping jurisdictions
The Review acknowledged consistency in EDR outcomes as critical to consumer confidence in
the financial system.50 By comparison, the Australian system – as it existed at the time of the
Review – was characterised by multiple EDR bodies, each with different jurisdictions, processes
and decision-making criteria. This led to inconsistent outcomes for customers with similar
disputes.51
In support of a single-scheme framework, Ramsay identified the case of ‘Emily’ as an
example of the inconsistent outcomes reached under the multiple-scheme arrangement.52 In this
case-study the insurer paid out Emily’s life insurance in a lump sum, failing to separate it over
two financial years. This resulted in the Australian Tax Office (ATO) imposing higher taxes on
the pay-out, and Centrelink seeking to cancel her social-welfare payments.53
The fundamental issue in this case centres on whether the insurer was duty bound to
inform the applicant of the tax and welfare implications of a lump-sum insurance payment. Upon
applying to FOS, it was determined that FOS did not have jurisdiction and the applicant was
referred to the SCT,54 where under their adjudication the applicant was forced to make highly
technical arguments. It was found that in adjudicating the matter the SCT relied on technical
arguments, whereas FOS adopted a more inquisitorial approach.55
While FOS and SCT decisions are guided by similar principles56, the approaches
between both EDR bodies illustrated how a fundamental issue – that of the duty of the insurer –
was reduced to jurisdictional and technical legal arguments about loss.57 This reduced the
emphasis on the conduct of the insurer when it failed to give salient advice. Consequently, the
processes did not adequately address the reality that the insured might suffer serious tax and
welfare implications.
Evidence was also presented of the confusion created by multiple EDR schemes. While
the CIO denied the existence of any empirical evidence indicating consumer confusion as to
which body to approach with a dispute,58 and while the same proposition was put forward by both
the Australian Finance Conference and Credit Corp Group,59 those arguments were discredited
by the statistics of cross-referrals between EDR bodies. The findings of the Review indicated that
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Commonwealth Treasury, the Review, Final Report, above n 1, 104 [5.70].
Ibid 104 [5.71].
Ibid 105.
Ibid.
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whether FOS or the SCT would adjudicate the dispute. The Review noted that this ‘...results in very different
experiences for the consumer, given the lengthy delays currently experiences by the SCT.’
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FOS referred nearly 1,000 disputes to the CIO and SCT in 2015-16 alone.60 The CIO referred
4 per cent of complaints and 16 per cent of enquiries to FOS in the same year.61 Such figures are
indicative not only of consumer confusion: because confusion would result in mis-filings and,
consequently, delays, it is also indicative of more pervasive issues affecting the overall efficacy of
the previous system.

Cross referrals and inconsistent outcomes
The Review labelled the prevalence of cross-referrals between EDR bodies as a ‘source of
inefficiency.’62 On a deeper analysis, the cross-referral statistics represented unnecessary
expenditure of resources and delays for consumers, before any work had commenced on
resolving their disputes.63 This unnecessary expenditure and elongated processing time was made
more acute by the underfunding of, for example, the SCT. The SCT had an average dispute
resolution time-frame of over two years.64
The Review noted further that where a jurisdictional dispute arose between FOS and the
SCT, FOS determined what aspects of the dispute fell within its jurisdiction.65 The exercise of
this discretion often led to fragmentation of the dispute, and inconsistent outcomes.66
Undoubtedly, this compounded delays, and increased consumer confusion.
Such delays, the Review asserted, exacerbate ‘consumer fatigue’, and deter consumers
from utilising EDR mechanisms to resolve disputes.67 Viewed from a practical perspective, such
outcomes risk causing consumers to give-up on pursuing any EDR process at all. Consequently,
consumers may have no other option but to seek costly assistance from the courts against FSPs;
most of which have far greater resources. In spite of these concerns, the CIO warned that
increased bureaucracy and lack of stakeholder accountability would offset any benefit attained
through the removal of EDR duplication.68 It is difficult to see how this would be the case in
practice, however, given the extent of issues associated with duplication, as discussed above.
Considering the recommendations to centralise the EDR framework, and the reporting and
supervising recommendations discussed in the next part of this paper, it appears that stakeholder
accountability is more likely to increase, and bureaucracy decrease, under the new regime.

Failures of Internal Dispute Resolution (IDR) mechanisms
a. The Code of Banking Practice
In response to the findings of the Review, that a single EDR body should replace FOS, CIO and
the SCT, the Mortgage and Finance Association of Australia (MFAA) contended that ‘at no point
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has the case for change been adequately made.’69 The MFAA’s position was clearly at odds with
the findings outlined in the Royal Commission’s subsequent Interim Report, which identified
instances of misconduct as being, at a minimum, contraventions of undertakings such as those
enshrined in the Code of Banking Practice (the Code). 70 That alone was evidence in support of
the argument that the current structure (as it then was), was failing consumers.
The Code was and remains voluntary; it establishes standards and rules which the
community can expect banks to follow in their dealings with customers. The provisions of the
Code deal with an array of matters including key commitments, general obligations, information
disclosure and resolution and monitoring of disputes (IDR and EDR).71 Compliance with the
Code was monitored by the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee (CCMC), now re-named
The Banking Code Compliance Committee (BCCC). The purpose of the CCMC/BCCC was
and is to ensure subscribing banks comply with the Code, through investigation of alleged
breaches, engagement with banks, and compliance monitoring.72
Part F of the Code established and empowered the CCMC, and made specific provision
for the ‘resolution of disputes, monitoring and sanctions’.73 Under that Part, the Code set out
timeframes and guidelines for the resolution of internal disputes, confirmed the availability of
EDR avenues for customers,74 and made a commitment to ‘prominently publicise the availability
and accessibility of both internal and external processes for resolving disputes.’75
One of the biggest problems associated with IDR practices identified in the Review was
the lack of available IDR data. This is attributable, in part, to ASIC’s lack of power to collect
recurring data about firms’ IDR activities. ASIC relies on firms that are required only to report
IDR information externally, where they subscribe to an industry code of practice. This is
problematic; there is evidence that even where firms are subscribers to a code of practice, this
does not necessarily result in compliance with such codes. Although the CCMC was tasked with
ensuring that banks complied with their obligations under the Code, the data in the CCMC’s
annual reports suggests this mandate was not met (see further infra).
The inefficiency of the CCMC was largely a product of the voluntary nature of the Code,
combined with inadequate self-reporting by banks. The CCMC acknowledged that they rely ‘on
information reported to it by Code-subscribing banks (banks) to monitor compliance with the
Code’.76 The efforts of the CCMC were hampered by the inconsistencies with which banks
identified and reported Code breaches.77 Even with inconsistencies in reporting, or failure to
69
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report at all, information provided to the CCMC was nonetheless sufficient to be a cause for
concern.
In its most recent annual report, the CCMC indicated that the number of total breaches
was down by 9.5 per cent to 10,123 total breaches from the previous year.78 However, this
‘decrease’ in total reported breaches must be weighted by the results from previous years. In
2014-15 there was a total of 6,558 self-reported breaches of the Code by banks.79 In 2015-16
there was a total of 7,987 self-reported breaches.80 Furthermore, in 2016-17, the total number of
self-reported breaches increased by 30 per cent, to a total of 11,191.81 With an increase of 4,633
self-reported complaints between 2014-15 and 2017-18, it is clear that complaint numbers overall
were trending upwards. The breaches reported by banks in the 2017-18 year affected a total of
3.43 million customers, with an estimated financial value of at least $95 million. 82
It is fair to say, therefore, that the Code of Banking Practice, and the attendant monitoring
and enforcement of, compliance with the Code proved to be flawed As such it re-affirmed the
need for a fair, efficient, and easily accessible complaints resolution mechanism in Australia.
b. Types of IDR Breaches
A source of considerable concern was the fact that a majority of IDR breaches stemmed from
the failure of banks to recognise a complaint.83 Other types of IDR breaches are set out in the
following table, which is extracted from a CCMC’s own motion inquiry.84
Types of IDR breaches
No. of breaches
Customer’s expression of dissatisfaction not recognised and logged as a
complaint
Final response in writing not sent to complainant
Complaint progress letters not issued within required timeframes
Complaints not recorded
Complaints not recorded or actioned
Errors in the resolution letter
Bank did not respond within required timeframe
Complaint resolved incorrectly
Total

1153
173
74
44
33
11
11
11
2240

During the same period banks reported that complaints were successfully resolved in 229
cases85 - fewer than the number incorrectly or inadequately processed. Clause 37 of the Code
78
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Year in Review, 2.
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required banks to have an IDR process that was free, accessible and that met the standards in
ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (RG 165).86 The IDR breaches, contained in the table above, are
instances where IDR conduct fell short of the standards set by RG 165.87 As an example, RG
165.78 sets out the definition of a complaint as

‘An expression of dissatisfaction made to an organisation, related to its
products or services, or the complaints handling process itself, where a
response or resolution is explicitly or implicitly expected.’88
As indicated in the table above, the most common type of IDR breach was the failure of
Banks to recognise a complaint. Failure to meet RG 165 standards was a breach of clause 37 of
the Code.89 The CCMC noted that banks tended to deal with Code breaches in a preventative
way (namely, they learned from the breach to prevent future occurrences). They tended not to
deal with the impact of breaches on individual customers.90 Of 5,168 breaches overall (ie IDR
and all other types combined) reported in 2018, the complaint was resolved by corrective action
in 672 cases, but an apology issued in only 379 instances.91 In a quarter of total breach incidents
(ie IDR and all other types combined), banks did not report any corrective action taken.92 The
2018 Annual Report indicates that, where corrective action was taken, in only 39 per cent of
cases was action taken to address customer issues.93
The Review highlighted a number of problems associated with current IDR processes. It
was prevalent for firms to fail to refer consumers to specialist IDR teams in order to initiate the
IDR process.94 Furthermore, insufficient information given to consumers about the availability of
EDR, where IDR proved unsatisfactory, was identified as a concern,95 and may have contributed
to consumers becoming overwhelmed by the IDR process.96 Customers who are overwhelmed
may ultimately give-up on seeking a resolution, or may accept an offer from the FSP that is
unreasonable.97 Such outcomes are unacceptable from a consumer perspective, and potentially
encourages firms to attempt to avoid liability for fault, or responsibility for rectification.
c. Monitoring
The 2018 Annual Report of the CCMC indicated that IDR obligations were among the top five
categories of breach.98 In a review of its own motion, the CCMC reported that of thirteen Code
86
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99

subscribing banks involved in the inquiry, one bank stated that it monitored 100 per cent of
calls, whereas six reported monitoring between three to eight calls per staff member per month.
Meanwhile, five banks either failed to provide a report on call monitoring activity, or reported
that they did not monitor calls within IDR teams.100 According to the CCMC, banks generally
identified Code breaches through pro-active monitoring mechanisms such as call monitoring and
quality assurance activities.101 Approximately 64 per cent of all Code breaches were identified
through call monitoring.102 Consequently the failure by the majority of banks to monitor calls
comprehensively constituted a serious omission, and indicated that the number of Code
breaches might in fact have been significantly higher than what had been reported.
In 2018, of the 240 IDR breaches reported, 95 per cent were reported by one bank.103
The CCMC conceded that this is not necessarily indicative of compliance generally in the
industry. The CCMC noted further that only five banks reported any IDR Code breaches.
However, many have reported low or no breaches of the Code pertaining to IDR
responsibilities.104 It is likely that the relatively low number of IDR breaches is attributable to
failure to report, rather than an absence of breaches.
As a result of the above failures by FSPs identified by the Review and the CCMC, the
case for change had been made. The importance and relevance of EDR mechanisms in this
regard is discussed in Part V (ii) (B) below.

Competition
It must be noted from the outset that, despite the existence of multiple EDR bodies, consumers
had no discretion as to which EDR body to approach in order to avail themselves of the most
favourable outcome in resolving a dispute.105 The same was not true of FSPs. FSPs were able to
elect which EDR body to belong to on the basis of such factors as which scheme had lower fees,
or less restrictive terms of reference.106 It is no surprise, therefore, that FSPs and their advocacy
groups favoured separate ombud schemes, and the concomitant opportunities for forumshopping and arbitrage.

99
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The MFAA contended that the centralisation of EDR bodies would ‘undermine the
fabric of external dispute resolution.’107 This position was grounded in their claim that separation
of entities is necessary for ensuring accountability, innovation and cost control. 108 The MFAA’s
sentiment was echoed by the CIO, which went so far as to reference amendments to their own
rules as ‘innovation arising from benchmarking,’109 and suggested that multiple schemes ultimately
benefit the consumer. The submissions within Chapter Five of the Review, particularly the
submission of FOS, debunks these arguments, however. FOS dismissed the claims made by the
CIO by noting that any change within FOS was not the result of benchmarking. More
appropriately, FOS claimed that improvements stem from independent reviews, member and
consumer feedback, and other mechanisms.110 ASIC and the Australian and New Zealand
Ombudsman Association (ANZOA) argued that competition ran counter to the principles of
fairness, efficiency, effectiveness and independence.111
In contradistinction, the Financial Services Complaints Ltd (FSCL) Report on New
Zealand’s multiple EDR schemes stated that competition between EDR schemes ‘has not been
dysfunctional.’ It suggested that there has not been evidence of a ‘race to the bottom’.112 However,
the FSCL Report later asserted that New Zealand’s current EDR schemes might follow the
international shift towards an EDR monopoly. Such a scheme, the FSCL Report contended, may
promote efficiency, or perhaps mark the development of a ‘national portal’ to help direct
consumers to the relevant scheme to handle their complaints.113
In response to these facts, the Review concluded that competition between schemes is
not ‘guaranteed’ to benefit all consumers. As such, competition was considered to be a
suboptimal strategy to pursue for the long-term interests of consumers.114 In support of this we
argue that justice is, or ought to be, a standard: an outcome is either just or unjust. We argue that
justice is not a free-floating concept open to competitive pressures. It seems instead that
competition is geared towards providing lower costs to firms,115 rather than conferring any benefit
on the consumer. Clearly, the private sector approach to free market competition impeded the
efficacy of the previous EDR arrangements. Any concerns of monopolistic behaviour by AFCA
will, at least theoretically, be mitigated by ASIC oversight, as discussed in Part V.

Commission Case Study: Suncorp and Low
After the death of his father, Rien Low and his mother were left with five business loans,
approximating $1 million, owed to Suncorp. Low’s father was the sole breadwinner and his
mother was unable to afford to service the loan repayments. A recommendation was sought from
FOS in relation to the loans. FOS found that the first four loans were made adequately but that
the fifth loan, worth $240,000, was affected by maladministration. FOS noted that if Suncorp
107
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had made adequate inquiries as to the purpose of the loan, it would not have been extended.
Low rejected this recommendation, appealing to the determination stage.116
During the interim period between the recommendation and the determination, Low
accepted an offer to buy the family home. His intention was to use the proceeds to pay out the
amounts owed under the valid loans and to pay the disputed loan off by instalments agreed upon
when the disputed loan was originated. The house was sold for $815,000. However, Suncorp
did not agree to this arrangement because the disputed loan would bear no interest. 117 As such,
this would effectively have amounted to an interest free loan to Mrs Low, spanning seventeen
years. Consequently, Suncorp was of the view that the proceeds of the sale should be used first
to pay out the disputed loan.
After the sale, Suncorp used the proceeds to pay out the undisputed loans. However, it
would only agree to pay out the residual sum to Low’s mother if she agreed to pay the disputed
loan within twelve months.118 FOS’s determination found that the disputed loan was made
irresponsibly, and that Suncorp should not be permitted to charge interest on the loan. 119
Importantly, FOS did not stipulate or require that the interest bearing loans be paid out before
the disputed loan.120 The Commission was unclear as to why a borrower could be forced to pay
profitable, interest bearing, and responsibly lent funds, in priority to irresponsible loans, which
are non-interest bearing.121
In cross-examination, Suncorp gave evidence as to their refusal to accept the Lows’ offer
to pay out the irresponsibly extended loan, according to the original payment plan. The
Commission was told that while the loan could be interest free for a reasonable period, after this
period interest should again be charged.122 Suncorp believed that a FOS determination had the
effect of bringing a loan contract to an end.123 What would then be left is a residual debt rather
than a loan contract, and the continuation of interest-free lending would go against industry
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practice.124 The distinction between what was actually meant by ‘residual debt’ and ‘loan contract’
was unclear.125
During the cross examination by Ombudsman Field, FOS gave evidence that its
determinations with respect to maladministration do not bring the loan to an end.126 It was made
unequivocally clear that in no way had the Lows’ loan contract been made void ab initio.127 As
such, FOS denied Suncorp’s assertion that there is an industry practice that treats such loans as
void pursuant to a FOS determination.128
Despite finding maladministration, and because FOS did not specify how the loan should
be repaid,129 consumers were left with an inconclusive outcome, and this was a major concern
when considering that most applicants to FOS have limited resources and access to
representation.130 Consequently, and despite the favourable FOS determination, Mrs Low is now
paying accelerated payments on a loan she should never have received.
This case illustrates that favourable FOS determinations do not necessarily translate into
favourable outcomes. As special counsel assisting the Commission noted, if the benchmark for
success under FOS was Mrs Low’s experience, then it was likely that others would be deterred
from making a complaint.131
Commissioner Hayne’s interim report also highlighted issues concerning FOS. One such
issue identified as worthy of further inquiry: the hearings demonstrated that ‘customers who were
wholly or partly successful in their claims nonetheless sometimes struggled to achieve what they
believed to be a satisfactory outcome’.132 Whether the problems mentioned in the Review,
concerning shortcomings of the old regime, were reasons for justifying these beliefs in
unsatisfactory outcomes is still unknown. Hayne intended to explore further whether ‘those
beliefs were unrealistic’ and why that may be the case.133

Financial Illiteracy
The Review clearly identified jurisdictional hurdles and issues surrounding accessible consumer
protection. Nevertheless, the general consensus amongst stakeholders was that the ombuds are
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an effective medium for quick dispute resolution.134 However, financial illiteracy may also be a
cause preventing consumers from using the ombuds’ services for dispute resolution.135 This
despite Australia ranking ninth in the world for financial literacy.136 As such, the Review stressed
the need for simplicity in the EDR framework.
ii.

Accountability and Credibility

Little is known about what the decision-making procedures of FOS were, because the terms of
reference gave no guidance as to this process.137 Given the lack of judicial oversight, and that the
TOR did not require panel members to have objectivity, 138 many concerns were raised as to the
independence of FOS. While ASIC had oversight of FOS,139 FOS itself, as a public company
limited by guarantee, was not covered by the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).140 As a
result the secretive nature of FOS’s determination processes caused some to question the
independence and integrity of the service.141

Goldie Marketing Pty Ltd v FOS142
Upon falling into default, the applicant made a complaint to FOS for negligent lending. A
consultant, advocating on behalf of the applicant, was told by a senior FOS lawyer in a recorded
phone call that the matter was ruled outside of their TOR.143 The advocate was told that, due to
temporary staff shortages in banking advisors, the matter could not progress. This was the case
even though, in the view of FOS, the matter had merit. 144
The applicant began an action against FOS, submitting that a mere staff shortage is not a
valid reason for a matter to be ruled outside the TOR.145 However, in file notes submitted to the
court, FOS claimed there were myriad other reasons for the exclusion.146 These file notes did not
correspond in any meaningful way to the conversations recorded by the advocate.
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FOS claimed that the file was not a verbatim record of the conversations, but a mixture
of comment and observation.147 However, this did not explain why the evidence submitted to the
Victorian Supreme Court suggested the content of conversations were different from what was
actually said.148 The reasons given by FOS were accepted by the court, which found them to be
convincing, rational, comprehensive and well-reasoned.149 However, no such list of reasons was
supplied to the applicant.150
Questions must be asked as to why a senior FOS figure, in a quasi-judicial role,
constructed a file note so materially different from what was actually said? In the view of the
applicant, insufficient resources to investigate a case was not an acceptable reason.151 This is
especially so, given that FOS is an industry-funded scheme. However, once again, because FOS
is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), little could be done. As FOS failed
to give a detailed account of what communication actually took place, its reputation and
credibility was severely diminished.152
iii.

Enforceability

Over the past ten years, considerable detriment has been caused to consumers by the financial
industry. According to the Review, approximately 80,000 consumers suffered losses totalling
more than $5 billion, due to their interaction with FSPs. 153 Under the previous EDR
arrangements, FOS handled 83 per cent of financial disputes relating to financial and credit
products and services.154 While the general framework of this regime was supposed to provide a
‘low cost, speedy and flexible access to redress’,155 the Review into EDR was borne out of the
‘alarming’ statistic that 18 per cent of FOS’s rulings against FSPs were unpaid by October 2016.156
As of August 2018, $16,040,397.79 had not been returned to applicants who were
successful before FOS. This figure is exclusive of any interest charges awarded to applicants on
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the base amount under dispute.157 FOS may also have awarded compensation for direct financial
loss or damage pursuant to its TOR. A significant amount of this compensation was unpaid as
well.158 FOS could expel FSP members for non-payment, though exercise of this power, in
practice, was rare.159

The FOS scheme had a contractual basis
The legal basis upon which FOS adjudicated disputes was grounded in contract.160 A tripartite
contract was formed between the consumer, the FSP and FOS.161 All FSPs were required to
implement their own IDR processes and be a member of an EDR scheme. 162 As such, FSP
members became bound by the TOR.163 Therefore, under contract, the parties agreed that
disputes would be determined under FOS’s TOR. The contractual nature of this EDR process
posed considerable hurdles for judicial review.164
Pursuant to the TOR, FOS resolved disputes in what it considered to be fair in all the
circumstances.165 It did this having regard to legal principles,166 industry codes167 and good
practice,168 as well as past FOS decisions.169 In the first instance, FOS would make a
recommendation as to how the dispute should be settled. This may have been rejected by either
the applicant or the FSP.170 If the recommendation was rejected, FOS would proceed to a
determination. At that stage, the FSP had no right to accept or reject the determination such that,
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if the applicant accepted it, it was binding.171 If the determination was rejected by the applicant,
the matter may then have proceeded to court.

FOS v Utopia Financial Services172 (Utopia)
FOS was able to litigate to enforce its determinations by virtue of its contractual relationship with
FSPs. In Utopia,173 the court made an order for specific performance in order to enforce its
determination.174 This had the effect of requiring the FSP to comply with the TOR, thereby
forcing compliance with the determination. However, constant referral to the courts for
adjudication was an untenable proposition, as it is inefficient and negates the goal of an EDR
process, as an alternative to costly court litigation.
It was argued in the Utopia case that specific performance should not be granted due to
lack of mutuality in the obligations of both parties.175 However, it was FOS itself that was
attempting to enforce the determination, not the applicants.
Utopia also sought to restrict specific performance on the grounds that FOS’s TOR
provided an alternative means of enforcement, such as its ability to expel a member FSP.
However, the court noted that this was not an adequate remedy, because it did not achieve any
performance of Utopia’s obligations, or constitute an adequate alternative remedy.176 As such,
this case illustrates that the courts may and do impose specific performance in relation to failures
to implement FOS determinations.

Other enforcement measures
Outside of litigation, there was very little recourse to enforce FOS determinations.
a. Binding professional-indemnity-insurers to determinations
One possible solution may be to bind professional-indemnity-insurance policies held by FSPs to
the determination itself. Professional indemnity insurance could act as a consumer protection
device that can compensate consumers of FSPs. Professional indemnity ensures compensation
for loss due to an act, error, or omission as a result of the services provided by an FSP. In
Australia, most FSPs have professional indemnity insurance.177
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The Australian Lawyers Alliance (ALA) made a submission regarding this measure to
the Senate Standing Committee on Economics.178 In particular, ALA noted the considerable
hurdles FOS has faced with non-compliance by FSPs with its determinations.179
ALA contended that the legislative amendments creating AFCA did not do enough to
address this issue. As such, ALA believed that professional indemnity insurers of FSPs should
be required to be members of AFCA. 180 In addition, ALA submitted that AFCA should be
empowered to join such insurers to a complaint, and bind them to the determination. While
AFCA can join other parties to a superannuation complaint, the policy reasons for not extending
this to non-superannuation complaints do not seem to have been well articulated. ALA suggested
that such a simple measure would reduce the pressure placed on any compensation scheme of
last resort.181
Conversely, and while this would be a simple measure to implement, it may distort the
function that professional indemnity insurance currently performs. According to the ASIC
Regulatory Guides, the role of professional indemnity insurance is not to protect consumers
directly. Such insurance is also not a guarantee that compensation will flow to consumers. 182 Thus,
the main role of professional indemnity insurance is to protect the insured against financial risks
arising from poor quality service and other misconduct by FSPs.183
What deserves to be adequately explored is whether binding professional-indemnityinsurers to determinations would lead to an increase in premiums, and whether those premium
184
increases would ultimately act as a disincentive to poor conduct and consumer abuse?
b. Compensation Scheme of Last Resort (CSLR)
Under the Review’s Supplementary Final Report,185 a CSLR was found to be necessary. The
Report noted that the scheme should be limited and carefully targeted. While the Panel was of
the view that reforms need to be made to professional indemnity insurance, it stated that such
reforms would not solve the problem of unpaid determinations.
The Review considered that any future CSLR should be the last resort, and should only
be available after all other avenues for compensation have been exhausted. 186 In particular, the
Review noted that any such scheme should apply prospectively, meaning the scheme can only
178
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be applied to determinations made after its establishment. 187 While such a reform is a step in the
right direction, it will do nothing to address FOS’ legacy of unpaid determinations.188 However,
the Minister for Revenue and Financial Services said that consideration of any CSLR would be
deferred until after the completion of the Commission. 189

Judicial review of FOS determinations
The prospects for judicial review of a FOS determination were bleak.190 An application for judicial
review had to be based on a breach of contract by FOS. The court required that the plaintiff
establish that the FOS determination was so unfair as to be a breach of the TOR.191 As a
consequence, the court’s prime concerns related to the construction of the terms of the contract.
In Patersons Securities Ltd v FOS,192 the court stressed that issues regarding contract
should not be confused with issues that are associated with an exercise of statutory power.193 As
such, the court was limited in its capacity to intervene in decisions that were a result of private
agreements. It could only intervene where the decision was made outside the TOR, where no
natural justice was afforded, or where the decision is one that no reasonable person could have
come to.194 A decision that is merely wrong is insufficient under this test. There were no successful
judicial merits reviews of FOS determinations.195
The lack of an effective judicial appeal mechanism represented another systemic failure
within the FOS framework. Accordingly, as there was no effective appeal process past the
determination stage, the only viable option was to litigate FOS determinations at considerable
expense.196 Further, no new helpful precedents were established which could have assisted
businesses and consumers to make sound commercial decisions.197
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INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
A comparison with a FOS operating in the United Kingdom (‘FOSUK’) sheds light on some of
the issues with respect to enforceability. In the UK, the application for judicial review in the case
of R (on the application of Kelly) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd & Shawbrook Bank Ltd
(Interested Party)198 demonstrated the general inaccuracies of FOSUK to properly summarise
complaints. This case concerned fraudulent conduct of a loan transfer without written evidence.199
The High Court quashed FOSUK’s decision, ruling against the applicant on the basis that it only
responded to the ‘perceived complaint’, rather than the ‘actual complaint.’ It was found that
FOSUK ‘was irrational’ and misunderstood the complaint altogether.200
Similarly, FOSUK is guided by its own TOR, which is premised on the principle that the
determination be ‘fair and reasonable in all the circumstances’.201 This was articulated in the case
of Aviva Life and Pensions (UK) Ltd v Financial Ombudsman Service in the UK.202 The case
elaborated on the scope of FOSUK’s mandate to make determinations that are ‘reasonable and
fair’, by taking into account the relevant rules and regulations.203 Coupled with this, the case also
made it incumbent on FOSUK to state, with detailed and adequate reasoning, why FOSUK
deviated from certain UK laws, particularly where those laws conflicted with what FOSUK
thought to be ‘fair and reasonable’.204 The Aviva case is not only demonstrative of the hurdles
FOSUK has in satisfying ‘fair and reasonable’ in their determinations, but also, simultaneously,
ensures FOSUK’s accountability in adjudicating upon the arguments of both parties.
The Aviva case is more reminiscent of the case of R. (Heather Moor & Edgecomb Ltd)
v Financial Ombudsman Service, where it was held that an ombudsman’s opinion must be ‘fair
and reasonable’.205 Should FOSUK make a perverse or irrational determination, as was the case
in Kelly v FOS, then the case of Heather Moor v FOS makes clear that FOSUK’s determinations
may be set aside on judicial review grounds.206
FOSUK’s jurisdictional conflicts, arising from its TOR, and premised on achieving a ‘fair
and reasonable’ outcome, have created a level of uncertainty in the financial dispute resolution
framework in the UK. It has created further tension between the law and a ‘fair and reasonable’
207
approach to financial dispute resolution, while inviting scrutiny and warranted scepticism. This
may, to some extent, undermine FOSUK’s authority and the enforceability of its determinations
against parties, such as insurers and financial institutions.
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In respect of costs, the Review refers to Brooker’s observation of FOSUK that ‘there is
no evidence that the single statutory scheme model is actually inefficient’ and that the costs per
case were quite favourable.208
While much discussion has been centred on the UK’s regulatory framework, Singapore
also provides a centralized body for consumers to resolve their disputes with financial institutions,
through Singapore’s Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre (Fidrec).209 Fidrec is governed
by an independent Board of Directors, and its conduct is bound by its own TOR. 210 The
Monetary Authority of Singapore has created a structure, through which Fidrec is funded by the
financial industry, as part of ‘the industry’s commitment to the general public to resolve
disputes’.211 Singapore’s single EDR body takes a similar approach to defining ‘fairness’ as the
UK’s FCA.212 However, it is difficult to objectively assess whether Fidrec does take a fair approach
to its determinations, especially when it is funded by financial institutions who are often the
defendants in financial dispute resolution cases,213 and because Fidrec requires plaintiffs to sign
non-disclosure declarations relating to case proceedings or outcomes.214
Similarly, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09, the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority (HKMA) made a proposal for a centralised EDR scheme, administered by
the Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC).215 Hong Kong’s EDR processes are not
governed by a statutory scheme like Australia and the UK. 216 The FDRC follows the same
structure that guided the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, that is, a two-tiered
process for resolving complaints – first mediation, then arbitration if mediation fails.217
Prior to 2011, Hong Kong lacked a centralised financial dispute resolution scheme
comparatively akin to Australia’s previous arrangement. The turning point in Hong Kong’s
regulatory architecture occurred in the aftermath of the Hong Kong ‘Minibonds Crisis’. In the
208
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lead-up to the crisis, a bank employee of Dah Sing Bank forged a customer’s signature to
purchase high-risk minibonds, issued by Lehman Brothers.218 Ordinarily, it was the Consumer
Council of Hong Kong that would have handled financial consumer complaints, but the HKMA
sought to embolden this style of relief. Consequently, in 2008, the HKMA announced a two-step
process of ‘mediation then arbitration’, to be administered by the Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre.219 At the time, the Securities and Futures Commission in HK provided a
proposal to the Financial Secretary, advocating for a scheme that is ‘simple, consumer friendly’
and empowered to order compensation.220
Although the primary concern at the time in Hong Kong was centred on the foundational
structure of their EDR regime, the HKMA sought to establish a more authoritative and
enforceable scheme, governed by appropriate TOR. This led to the establishment of the FDRC
and, ultimately, the construction of a centralised financial dispute resolution arrangement.
Notwithstanding Hong Kong’s methodical approach to establishing the FDRC, the FDRC’s
TOR resembles similar principles found in the UK and Singapore of facilitating a ‘fair and
speedy resolution’, allowing parties a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to present their case, while acting
‘impartially’.221
In light of the problems embedded in a multiple dispute resolution scheme, the
international financial regulatory landscape illustrates a meaningful shift towards a centralised
EDR framework. While each EDR framework analysed above is centralised, the style of
executing their functions differs according to their interpretation of a fair and reasonable
approach to forming a determination. It does, however, provide an objective foundation to ruling
on EDR matters, but it also presents an interesting inconsistency where each country tends to
provide their own distinctive EDR framework based on past experience and historical mistakes.
The establishment of AFCA firmly supports this point.

THE NEW REGIME
i.

The AFCA Model

The former EDR schemes in Australia are now incorporated into AFCA. AFCA is a not-forprofit company that commenced receiving disputes in November 2018. 222 The establishment of
223
AFCA has incurred establishment costs to the industry of some $48.5m to date.224
The existence of a single EDR body will simplify the process for consumers,225 while
AFCA is endowed with a broader remit to review claims and disputes across the entire financial
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sector.226 For members of the AFCA board, experience regarding consumer representation and
experience in operating member businesses will be equally weighted.227 This is a solid
accountability measure which is likely also to have a positive impact on consumers. More
significantly, AFCA will be able to join FSPs, which will enable it to consider all the parties
involved. This will make AFCA’s decisions fairer, more comprehensive, and will allow greater
transparency in the apportionment of liability.228 Here, AFCA’s decision making will be guided,
in part, by the corporate regulator, ASIC, which will provide independent oversight of AFCA,
and in part because AFCA will also be subject to review by an independent assessor.
AFCA retains FOS’s objective of achieving ‘fairness in all circumstances’.229 AFCA will
make use of an expert panel for complex disputes, or where a dispute may result in a decision
which may set an industry standard.230 Combining EDR schemes will invariably result in
economies of scale.231 This in turn will likely lead to a greater level of efficiency, which will
generate positive spill-over effects for consumers and FSPs.232

Comparison with the UK
Australia’s AFCA is authorised and empowered by the Treasury Laws Amendment (Putting
Consumers First—Establishment of the Australian Financial Complaints Authority) Act 2018
(Cth) (‘the AFCA Act’).233 FOSUK is given statutory powers under the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000.234 In particular, FOSUK is guided by the principle of a ‘fair and reasonable’
outcome in their determinations in s 228(2) of the Act. 235 AFCA has not faced judicial review
similar to that of FOSUK, due to its recent establishment. Nonetheless, the statutory powers
embedded in the UK’s Financial Services and Markets Act lends considerable flexibility to
FOSUK to form a view that is ‘fair and reasonable’.236 As mentioned previously, AFCA has also
retained this principle from FOS in Australia, to ensure flexibility in making determinations.
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AFCA also operates in accordance with its ‘Rules’, which form a contract with financial firms and
complainants, and provides an overview of how AFCA considers complaints.237

Compensation Caps
As discussed below, the Ramsay Review made an important recommendation for this new body
to lift the monetary limit from $500,000 to $1m, and the compensation cap from $300,000 to
$500,000.238 While these recommendations have been implemented with the establishment of
AFCA, it is at this stage difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the Review’s recommendations.
In forming a broader perspective on Australia’s current scheme, Australia has a much
higher monetary limit than comparative nations, such as New Zealand (NZ$200,000), the UK
(AUD$240,000), Singapore (AUD$94,000) or Canada (AUD$355,000).239 The general trend of
increasing monetary limits to make EDR a more accessible avenue has been closely followed by
Singapore’s Fidrec.240 In December 2016 Fidrec decided to increase the monetary limit for
financial dispute claims from SGD$50,000 to SGD$100,000 (USD$36,710 to USD$73,420) for
non-insurance claims. This decision is in line with current insurance related claim limits of
SGD$100,000 (USD$73,420).241
Similar to other jurisdictions surveyed, Hong Kong’s FDRC falls below Australia’s new
monetary limit, with a claimable amount of up to HKD$1,000,000 (USD$127,685).242 However,
like Australia and Singapore, Hong Kong followed the general trend of doubling the maximum
claimable amount from HKD$500,000 to HKD$1,000,000 (USD$63,842 to USD$127,685),
effective 1 January 2018.243
An international comparison of compensation caps makes it clear that Australia is ahead
of other comparative jurisdictions. The new framework ensures consumers find EDR accessible,
while reducing the need for consumers to pursue litigation.
ii.

Efficacy

Consolidation of the multiple EDR bodies into AFCA will help address issues surrounding
undue complexity and fragmentation of disputes surrounding jurisdictional issues. This in turn
will reduce unnecessary customer confusion. It will further mitigate delays by allowing the
allocation of greater staff numbers to congested work queues, while removing duplicate costs for
both firms and the scheme, as concluded by the Review panel.244
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Compensation caps
With respect to monetary limits and compensation caps under the old regime, the Review
highlighted that the $500,000 cap was outdated, because it did not reflect the ‘general economic
indicators and the current values of financial products held by consumers’.245 What was intended
here by Ramsay, was to provide a compensation scheme that would be broad enough for
consumers to access, while also adjusting the monetary limit for growth in average wages. 246
Ramsay’s approach to the former EDR framework is summarised in his ‘principles’ on
compensation caps, which were aimed to ensure the framework is ‘easy to understand for
consumers’ and ‘easy to apply’ by EDR entities.247 Ramsay’s principled-based approach also
included the aim that the ‘substantial majority’ of consumer disputes be resolved by the EDR
body, and that monetary limits and compensation caps reflect ‘general economic indicators’ and
the ‘current value’ of financial products held by consumers.248
These limits are also subject to continuous review and indexation by an independent
assessor.249 Meanwhile, there are no caps for superannuation complaints or compensation.250
Ramsay also recommended an independent review of AFCA eighteen months into its operation.
The aim of the independent review will be to determine the impact of the new compensation
caps on consumer outcomes, and competition. This approach mirrors the pillars of
accountability and enforceability, mentioned above.251
As of February 2019, AFCA welcomed the Australian Government’s announcement to
extend AFCA’s remit to review eligible financial complaints from 1 January 2008. 252 This remit
is expanded for a period of 12 months and re-enforces accountability measures, by allowing more
people access to justice.253 Ordinarily, AFCA would only consider matters that have occurred in
the past six years (reduced to two years if the complaint has been through a firm’s IDR process).254
In other words, legacy issues relating to unpaid determinations under the old regime will see the
new compensation caps backdated to periods prior to the establishment of AFCA.
In the midst of Commissioner Hayne’s release of the Commission’s final report,
Australian political parties provided bipartisan support for the establishment of a compensation
scheme of last resort.255 Commissioner Hayne endorsed the Ramsay Review’s recommendation
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to establish such a scheme, in which AFCA will be responsible for administering the scheme’s
$30 million fund, from 1 July 2019.256
Furthermore, because AFCA will be able to hear disputes of a higher value, more
consumers and small businesses will be able to access EDR, and avail themselves of fair
compensation, if they have wrongfully suffered a loss. 257 Consistent with increases in claim
thresholds, the robustness of the decision-making process will also be enhanced. AFCA must
adopt a consistent approach to making decisions,258 demonstrate the principle of comparability
of outcomes,259 publish its decisions,260 and take into account previous decisions.261 As such, an
appropriate attempt is made to move away from the seemingly ad hoc FOS approach to decision
making. It is hoped that determinations by AFCA will not be inconclusive as to their execution,
as was the case with the previous EDR regime.262

IDR
When hearing disputes of a higher value, and in consideration of the problems associated with
IDR processes under the old regime as discussed above, the Review recommended that
complaints received by AFCA should be referred back to the firm for IDR. 263 Once referred back
to the firm, the complaint will be subject to tracking and monitoring by AFCA, providing
necessary additional support for vulnerable consumers. This approach also provides an
opportunity for systemic and cultural issues within firms to be identified and ultimately resolved,
in turn contributing to a culture of continual improvement.
In order for IDR processes to be sufficiently fortified against the evasive tactics deployed
by some firms, ASIC should publish the details of non-compliance, and identify the firms
responsible. This view was endorsed by the Joint Consumer Group, who appropriately suggested
that such a method would promote a culture of compliance and continuous improvement.264
ASIC should not be imbued with discretion to determine whether or not to identify firms,265 as
failing to do so allows firms to avoid a direct impact upon their reputation for continued failings;
the power to do so makes ASIC vulnerable to capture. Such an outcome would detract from the
efficiency of any culture of compliance.
The AFCA Complaint Resolution Scheme Rules specifically make provision for
addressing systemic issues in IDR processes (Rule A.17). The Rules allow for investigation,
monitoring, and reporting of identified systemic issues to the relevant authorities.266 In response,
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the submissions of ANZ, Westpac and the Banking Association created a false dichotomy: they
implied an inverse relationship between levels of prudential regulation and levels of consumer
protection. They suggested any increased emphasis on one, necessarily diminished the other.
Both ANZ and Westpac took specific issue with Rule A.17,267 suggesting that the current
regulatory framework allows for greater balance between prudential considerations and
consumer protection.268 The position of the banks in relation to A.17 is that AFCA’s approach is
too narrow, in that it is too far weighted towards consumer protection, and fails to leave sufficient
scope for adequate prudential regulation.
Given that the typical complainant is unrepresented,269 Rule A.17 is an important step
towards addressing the inherent inequality in the bargaining position of FSPs and their customers
to negotiate desirable outcomes. It incentivises FSPs to implement robust IDR processes that
achieve efficacious outcomes in the first instance, and ensures accountability to their customers.
It also seems that firms are concerned that the new regime may force them to bear the
consequences of misconduct, evident from submissions of the Banking Association, that allowing
AFCA and regulators to address systemic issues may result in ‘duplication or inconsistency.’270
There is an historical tendency for firms to expect minimal consequences for failure to comply
with proper IDR processes. This tendency has cultivated an attitude of nonchalance with respect
to instituting and adhering to their own IDR frameworks. Rule A.17 imbues AFCA with more
pervasive powers to investigate potential systemic issues.271 Further, it grants AFCA powers to
monitor a matter until an outcome acceptable to AFCA is reached,272 as opposed to an outcome
acceptable to the firm.273
Under Rule A.9, firms are required to provide all relevant information relating to a
dispute, unless it does not or no longer exists, or cannot reasonably be obtained. 274 One
submissions suggested that the final incarnation of this rule would represent a compromise
following submissions on the draft rules by various associations, suggesting that firms should be
compelled to procure the documents whether they are in possession or in control of the
documents or not.275 Further submissions suggested that documents containing confidential
information should not be withheld if it is possible to redact the confidential content. 276 The final
drafting of the rule contains the proviso that the firm provide a statutory declaration as to why
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the documents cannot be provided. However, the effectiveness of this safeguard, in practice,
remains to be seen.
Another potential area for concern, is the exemption of complaints relating to a practice
or policy that does not involve an allegation of maladministration or inappropriate application of
the practice or policy.277 Rule C.2.2(c) fetters AFCA’s ability to adjudicate on complaints arising
directly from the IDR process itself. 278 Therefore, AFCA has no power to assess the integrity of
any IDR policy or procedure, provided that procedure was correctly administered.
279
In an interview conducted by the lead author with CEO of AFCA David Locke , some
promising insight was provided regarding the operation of AFCA since commencement. At the
time of writing, AFCA had received approximately 23,000 disputes, 48 per cent of which had
been settled within the four months of AFCA’s operation. Fifteen per cent of unresolved disputes
had been referred to adjudicators. Ninety-one point two per cent of members of AFCA had
generated no disputes, with 8.8% of members responsible for all disputes. It remains to be seen
whether the industry funding model discussed immediately below will serve to ameliorate the
trend of a majority of disputes being generated by a minority of FSPs.

Competition
The consolidation of the multiple EDR bodies into AFCA mitigates a number of concerns
associated with competition, discussed above. Membership of AFCA is mandated for all firms
by statute. Compulsory membership removes the ability of firms to exploit the opportunity to
join the EDR body they favour most. Despite being framed as a criticism by the MFAA and the
CIO, preventing firms from leaving a scheme, where they are of the view that they have been
subjected to ‘high charges and poor service’,280 is a positive shift for consumers.281
The AFCA funding model fact sheet also addresses concerns of rising costs as a result of
a single-entity scheme. The AFCA funding model explicitly states that the user charge will
promote and reward high rates of resolution at the IDR stage,282 and reward firms who ‘reduce
the need for their customers to use AFCA.’283 This concept manifests in a user charge that will
only be applied for members with more than 1 complaint in a 12 month period. The user charge
will be determined by reference to the volume and complexity of complaints closed over that
period.284
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The MFAA made the argument that large financial firms stand to benefit under the
centralised scheme, at the expense of smaller firms.285 Our research indicates that this is incorrect
in respect of AFCA, by virtue of the scaled membership fee outlined in the fact sheet.
Appropriately, complaints fees are based on the stage of the process at which the complaint is
resolved, and the complexity of complaints extending beyond the initial investigation phase.286
Although historically industry funding may have had the potential to affect the independence of
EDR bodies, mandatory membership and the fee scheme mitigates such potential.
The cost mechanisms in place under AFCA incentivises firms to resolve disputes at the
initial stages. The mandatory membership requirements of a single scheme alleviates any
independence issues, by removing the opportunity for firms to seek alternate EDR bodies with
lower fees. The new scheme also allows reduction of fees only in correlation with a reduction in
lengthy dispute resolution procedures, representing a significant positive change for consumers.
iii.

Enforceability

Prospects for Judicial Review under AFCA
Outcomes from AFCA are excluded from judicial review.287 As such, litigation risk for AFCA
determinations will be as problematic as those under FOS. Experience has shown that
ombudsmen are not infallible, and it is peculiar that judicial oversight of AFCA determinations
is denied. Though a favourable finding is unlikely,288 (in other words, the Court’s reticence to
declare that FOS exercised a public function), the outcome will turn on whether AFCA is
289
exercising a public function.
If the approach taken is that AFCA is exercising hybrid powers as those described in R v
Takeovers Panel Ex parte Datafin Plc290 (Datafin), then a finding of a public function may be
feasible and justify judicial review on this basis. In Datafin, the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers
(‘the Panel’) was an unincorporated association. It had no statutory basis, nor did it exercise
statutory, prerogative or common law powers.291 The Panel was not in a contractual arrangement
with anyone that it regulated.
The primary role of the Panel was to oversee the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.
This created a code of conduct that had to be observed in the takeovers of listed public
285
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companies.292 The Panel itself had no power to actually enforce the code. However, much like
AFCA, it could determine whether a breach existed. A finding that there was a breach of the
code could result in statutory sanctions, such as the exclusion or the suspension of a company
listed on the exchange.293
In determining whether the Panel was subject to judicial review, the court was of the view
that the source of power was not the sole test.294 In this respect, Lloyd LJ stated that while the
source of power will usually be decisive, this is an issue of degree. At one extreme, where the
source of the power is pursuant to some legislative instrument, it is clear that the body is subject
to judicial review. At the other end of the scale, if the source of the power is contractual, then the
body is not subject to judicial review. Between both of these extremes there is an area where it is
prudent not only to look at the source of the power, but also the nature of that power.295
Despite the fact that the Panel was an unincorporated association deriving power through
contract, the court found that it was exercising a public function. A number of decisions of the
Panel suggested that it was, in effect, exercising public power.296 Of particular interest to the court
was that the Panel was integral to the government’s regulation of financial markets. The nature
of the decisions made by the panel were such that they affected a large number of people, most
of whom had not consented to the exercise of its power. As such, the court found that the Panel
performed a fundamental role in a system that had a public law character.297 Moreover, the court
noted that if its decisions were ignored, public law sanctions would be imposed, and so in this
way the Panel was performing a public law function.298
Given the outcome in Datafin, there is now scope, at least in the UK, for non-government
entities to be made subject to judicial review. The concept of Hybrid powers contemplated by
this case were further articulated by Rose LJ:

A body whose birth and constitution owed nothing to any exercise of
governmental power may be subject to judicial review if it had been woven into
the fabric of public regulation or into a system of government control or was
integrated into a system of statutory regulation or was a surrogate organ of
government or but for its existence a government body would assume
control.299
However, in Australia this line of cases has gained little traction.300 Given the loose
foothold of this jurisprudence,301 it is improbable that AFCA will fall under the auspices of the
Datafin principle. The main hurdle for parties approaching AFCA, and who then want to avail
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themselves of review, will be to establish that, by making its determinations binding on FSPs,
AFCA is exercising a public function. As noted above, the courts have clearly indicated that FOS,
in making its determinations, was not exercising a public function. 302 In Mickovski v FOS &
Anor,303 the court stated:

The public interest in the existence of a dispute resolution mechanism
to resolve private disputes, however desirable from the point of view of public
policy, does not in my view constitute a public function or element which of
its nature is sufficient to invoke the principle in Datafin. The public interest
evident in the regulatory framework is that there should be a mechanism for
private dispute resolution but I do not think it can be said that FOS is
exercising a public duty or public element when its jurisdiction is consensually
invoked by the parties to a complaint. Mr Mickovski was under no obligation
to make use of FOS and the terms of reference makes clear that complainants
are not bound by decisions of FOS.304
While it is arguable whether FOS’s jurisdiction is consensually invoked,305 given how the
case law has developed, it is unlikely that it will be said that AFCA is exercising a public function.
As such, it is likely that the limited rights of judicial review under FOS will continue to be a
feature of AFCA.306

Targeted Reviews under AFCA
While acknowledging the role of independent reviews, in regard to public accountability and the
promotion of a culture of improvement,307 the Review points to deficiencies in the current system.
These include ASIC’s lack of power to require ‘targeted’ reviews of particular problems, and the
lack of obligations for schemes to publish responses to recommendations, report on the
implementation of such recommendations, or on follow-up action following a review.308 In
response, the report recommends the EDR body be ‘subject to more frequent, periodic
independent reviews, and provide detailed responses in relation to recommendations of
independent reviews.’309
Significantly, the recommendation to establish an independent assessor to monitor and
review complaints handling will likely facilitate and strengthen the use of better procedures, and
the delivery of satisfactory outcomes for consumers.
The above recommendations for independent reviews were made prior to the inception
of AFCA. As discussed in Part 4 of this paper, AFCA is subject to reviews of this nature. The
recommendations made by the Review were agreed on in principle by FOS, who confirmed the
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need for detailed responses to recommendations of independent reviews, updates on
implementation of recommendations, and detailed explanations when recommendations were
not accepted.310 This position was qualified by the suggestion that if more frequent reviews were
required, the EDR must have flexibility to undertake targeted reviews, rather than a
comprehensive review each time.311 This is reasonable when considering the costs and time
involved in such reviews.312 However, it remains to be seen whether this would present a potential
detriment in terms of then extending the time in which other potential problems could be
identified and addressed.

ASIC Review
Like FOS, AFCA is required to report instances of non-compliance to ASIC.313 In 2014,
FOS stated that they were in active discussions with ASIC about how best to approach this issue.314
However, four years on, unpaid determinations are still of concern.315 AFCA does have additional
statutory powers, which increase its ability not to be ignored by FSPs. However, these only relate
to superannuation complaints.316 The Panel recommended an increase to ASIC’s powers, by
allowing ASIC to intervene when AFCA does not comply with legislative and regulatory
requirements – used as a last resort following consultations with AFCA. 317 While the Head of the
Consumer Action Law Centre, Gerard Brody, stated that AFCA will be able to ‘engage in a
process of continual improvement’ due to regular independent reviews,318 ASIC’s inability to
sufficiently execute their mandate319 may, however, cause some to lack confidence in ASIC’s
ability to enforce principles of independence, efficiency, and fairness against AFCA.
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Cultural failings of enforcement
The Commission identified key issues relating to the conduct of financial firms. Issues identified
include the culture and corporate governance framework, the capability and effectiveness of
financial regulators, and conflicts of interest, particularly with respect to remuneration.320 It was
clear that ‘risk to reputation was ignored’ by financial institutions, and that ASIC had done little
to prevent prohibited conduct by financial firms.321 While ASIC’s conduct and its ability to fulfil
its functions was a significant source of issues that came before the Commission, it also raised
doubts as to ASIC’s ability to review AFCA in accordance with their mandate. For example,
ASIC has demonstrated a willingness in the past to countenance illegal and unethical behaviour
by, for example, negotiating with banks in respect of enforcement outcomes.322
ASIC’s inability to enforce the law is concerning. It was noted that civil proceedings are
‘seldom’ brought.323 ASIC’s regulatory tools, such as enforcement, engagement, surveillance, and
education were not sufficiently used, despite the fact that 70 per cent of ASIC’s regulatory
resources were deployed for surveillance and enforcement. 324 Evidently, ASIC’s response to
misconduct to date appears to be woefully inadequate. The Hayne Royal Commission interim
report emphasised the importance that existing laws ‘be obeyed’, and not simply dismissed as
‘just a breach of those laws’,325 as ASIC’s responses suggest.
In essence, ASIC demonstrably contributed to a culture of regulatory failings. ASIC
seemed to have been more concerned with ‘negotiation’ and ‘accommodation’,326 as well as
securing acquiescence from banks ‘later than the law required.’327 The Commission showed that
public denunciation of unlawful conduct played ‘no part in ASIC’s current enforcement
approach’ – a position with which ASIC’s Senior Executive Leader, Financial Advisers, Louise
Anne Macaulay – agreed.328 Unless ASIC demonstrates an improvement in its efficacy, ASIC
oversight of AFCA will not serve as it is intended: a last line of defence.
iv.

Accountability and Credibility

Independent Reviews
Despite the lack of judicial oversight, and as noted above, AFCA will be subject to regular
independent reviews.329 This feature accords with the calls for greater accountability measures by
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the Ramsay Review.330 The independent assessor’s review,331 the TOR of which will be determined
by the board,332 will consider complaints regarding standards of service.333 Such reviews, conducted
appropriately, will produce greater levels of efficacy over time. As discussed above, membership
of the board will require an equal representation of professional experience in operating member
businesses, and representing consumers.334 This is a solid accountability measure. AFCA must
comply with the assessor’s demands.335 Its findings will be submitted to the Chief Ombudsman
who can then accept or reject them.336 If this feature is effective it will provide a valuable incentive
to AFCA to maintain high serviceability standards.

Freedom of Information
AFCA will not be subject to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), due to its status as a
public company.337 This is concerning, given that the efficacy of the independent assessor and
new board representation measures remain to be seen.

CONCLUSION
Australia is undergoing major changes to its current financial system. These changes are due, in
part, to the Banking Royal Commission and the Ramsay Review. However, it is evident that the
trend from a multiple EDR scheme to a single EDR scheme is not limited to Australia. This
change is also being undertaken internationally in key countries, as discussed above.
While AFCA has yet to be holistically evaluated in relation to its efficacy and
accountability in resolving financial disputes, the Australian financial system will continue to face
significant challenges. As noted by the Commission, the enforcement of laws against FSPs
continues to be of vital importance. It may be that ASIC will need to be further empowered to
enforce such laws, and to appropriately execute its functions in reviewing AFCA’s performance.
Crucially, as highlighted by the Commission, regulatory action requires more than simply
vesting the regulator with power to enforce the law. Effective regulatory action also requires the
regulator to be imbued with a culture of enforcement. ASICs propensity to cultivate a culture of
insufficient regulatory scrutiny, and the consequences of such an approach, have now been
brought to the forefront by the Commission. Only time will tell whether the regulators are able
or willing to effect the necessary cultural changes required to operate efficiently in their role.
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39

AFCA: Enhancing Australia’s Twin Peaks
Positive steps have been made in the Australian financial system, which has begun the
process of financial reform with the establishment of AFCA. As to the future of the regulatory
landscape of the Australian financial sector, and the full measures recommended to be
implemented for consumer protection, Australia awaits the responses to the recommendations
made within Commission’s Final Report, and the manner in which those recommendations
slated for adoption will be implemented. In addition, Australia awaits further information on
AFCA’s performance, once it has been in operation for a sufficient length of time, to provide a
more comprehensive assessment of its efficacy.

